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BANK OF AMERICA V. CITY OF MIAMI: 
STANDING AND CAUSATION UNDER THE 
FAIR HOUSING ACT 
Alan M. White* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Progress towards racial equality in America has been a long 
journey, of many steps forward and many steps backward. The crisis 
of 2007-2008 was a large step backwards in the struggle for economic 
equality, in which the homeownership gains of African-Americans 
during the 1980s and 1990s were submerged in a historic wave of 
foreclosures and home losses. In Bank of America v. City of Miami,1 
the Supreme Court confronted two vital questions of responsibility 
under the equality norms of the 1968 Fair Housing Act: 1) whose 
actions are responsible for the persistent residential segregation and 
inequality (causation), and 2) who are the victims of housing 
segregation who may hold the responsible parties to account 
(standing)? The Court’s compromise decision allowing the case to 
proceed was a step forward on the standing issue and a step backwards 
on causation. The majority opinion reflected its continuing 
ambivalence towards recognizing racial segregation as a systemic and 
intractable feature of our society, both accepting and denying the 
broad and shared responsibility for causing this structural inequality 
and for breaking it down. 
II.  HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK 
A.  Housing Segregation and the 1968 Fair Housing Act 
Black and white Americans have lived in segregated housing in 
segregated neighborhoods since the beginning of the twentieth 
 
 * Alan M. White is Professor of Law at CUNY School of Law; he co-authored the Housing 
Scholars’ amicus curiae brief in Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami. 
 1. 137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017). 
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century.2 The racial apartheid in American cities was the product of a 
systemic public-private collaboration, combining private housing 
market conduct (the actions of white homeowners and landlords) and 
federal, state and local government policies. In response to the first 
waves of the great migration of former slaves to the North in the early 
1900s, several cities adopted ordinances restricting the areas in which 
blacks could rent or buy homes.3 The Supreme Court struck down 
these racial zoning laws under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, because of the direct state involvement in 
explicit racial discrimination.4 In response, white homeowners banded 
together to sign racially restrictive covenants preventing the sale of 
homes to nonwhites. The Supreme Court eventually held in 1948 that 
judicial enforcement of those covenants was unconstitutional state 
action in Shelley v. Kraemer.5 From the time public housing came into 
being in the 1930s, local public housing authorities reinforced racial 
segregation through their siting and tenant assignment policies.6 The 
Federal government also played a major role in mortgage redlining, 
denying mortgage credit to minority neighborhoods.7 The 
Homeowners Loan Corporation of the New Deal, followed by the 
Federal Housing Administration and Veteran’s Administration 
mortgage insurance programs of the post-War period, promoted the 
use of racially restrictive covenants and cut off mortgage credit to 
integrated or minority neighborhoods, and denied cheap home 
financing to African-Americans.8 The unique hypersegregation of 
African-Americans in urban ghettoes has resulted from a continual 
and complex interplay of individual, corporate, and government 
policies, decisions, and behaviors.9 Residential segregation is at the 
root of many other forms of racial inequality, in education, health, 
 
 2. JAMES H. CARR & NANDINEE K. KUTTY, The New Imperative for Equality, in 
SEGREGATION, THE RISING COSTS FOR AMERICA 1–3 (Gregory Squires ed., 2008). 
 3. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., An Open Letter to Justice Clarence Thomas from a Federal 
Judicial Colleague, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1005, 1022 (1992). 
 4. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). 
 5. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
 6. Richard Rothstein, Public Housing: Government-Sponsored Segregation, THE AM. 
PROSPECT (Oct. 11, 2012), https://prospect.org/article/public-housing-government-sponsored-
segregation.  
 7. Id. 
 8. CARR & KUTTY, supra note 2, at 21–22. 
 9. See GREGORY D. SQUIRES & CHARIS E. KUBRIN, PRIVILEGED PLACES: RACE, 
RESIDENCE, AND THE STRUCTURE OF OPPORTUNITY (2006). 
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employment, and even physical safety,10 and has been one of the most 
difficult legacies of Jim Crow to dismantle. 
In the landmark 1964 Civil Rights Act, Congress chose not to take 
on housing discrimination, and specifically exempted the federal 
housing agencies (the Federal Housing Authority and the Veteran’s 
Administration mortgage programs) from that Act’s coverage.11 It was 
only after the long hot summers of 1964-1966, the Kerner 
Commission report on urban riots, and finally the assassination of Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr. in 1968, that Congressional resistance gave 
way, at least partly, and the 1968 Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) was 
passed.12 Even then, it was only two decades later that Congress made 
effective enforcement of the FHA possible. 
The original FHA was designed by Congress to be only weakly 
enforceable. The 1968 Act limited Justice Department enforcement to 
cases involving a pattern or practice of discrimination, or issues of 
general public importance; damages awarded to private plaintiffs were 
typically very modest.13 It wasn’t until the 1988 Fair Housing 
Amendments Act14 that Congress authorized full private and federal 
agency enforcement in individual as well as pattern and practice cases. 
The 1988 amendments added disability as a protected class, allowed 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development to investigate 
discrimination complaints and award damages and injunctions, 
allowed the Justice Department to bring civil enforcement actions 
without needing to show a pattern, practice, or an issue of general 
public importance, and increased the punitive damages cap from 
$1,000 to $10,000 in individual civil actions.15 
Although the Fair Housing Act covered mortgage lending 
discrimination since its enactment in 1968,16 most of the early 
enforcement, by the government and private parties, was directed at 
discrimination in renting homes and selling homes and at exclusionary 
zoning practices of local planning agencies. Fair lending enforcement 
 
 10. PATRICK SHARKEY, STUCK IN PLACE: URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE END OF 
PROGRESS TOWARD RACIAL EQUALITY (2013). 
 11. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). 
 12. Douglas S. Massey, The Legacy of the 1968 Fair Housing Act, 30 SOC. F. 571–88 (2015). 
 13. GEORGE R. METCALF, FAIR HOUSING COMES OF AGE (1988). 
 14. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73, 42 U.S.C. § 805. 
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began in earnest after the 1988 amendments and continued to expand 
through the passage of the 1991 amendments to the 1974 Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act.17 The impact of mortgage lending discrimination on 
housing segregation might seem more remote, and the actions of 
mortgage lenders less directly responsible, than the racially biased 
practices of private landlords, realtors, and public housing authorities. 
Nevertheless, banks and the federal mortgage agencies were and are 
critical to the creation and perpetuation of residential segregation, and 
no societal plan to end housing segregation could be complete without 
taking on the lending policies and practices of banks and the mortgage 
industry. 
B.  Supreme Court Cases Under the FHA 
The early Fair Housing Act cases to come before the Court 
involved overt discrimination by landlords and realtors against 
minority applicants. In those cases, the Court repeatedly faced issues 
of identification: who are the “victims” of housing discrimination and 
racial segregation entitled to sue, and who are the actors whose 
conduct is responsible for it, and who should therefore be liable? 
These intertwined issues of standing, causation, and intent are featured 
in most of the Court’s significant Fair Housing Act cases. 
In its first decision interpreting the FHA, Trafficante v. 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,18 the Court faced the victim identification 
issue. All nine justices agreed that black and white tenants in an 
apartment building had standing under the statute to sue their landlord 
for discriminating against nonwhite applicants.19 The tenants asserted 
that they were injured by losing the social and business benefits of 
living in an integrated community.20 The Trafficante decision was 
remarkable in its broad reading of statutory standing and its 
recognition that race discrimination by landlords affects persons other 
than the rejected applicants. Significantly, the Court unanimously held 
that Congress had defined the class of persons harmed by housing 
discrimination broadly, and that losing the opportunity to live in a 
 
 17. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/GGD-96-145, FAIR LENDING: FEDERAL 
OVERSIGHT AND ENFORCEMENT IMPROVED BUT SOME CHALLENGES REMAIN at 5 (1996); John R. 
Walter, Fair Lending Laws and Their Enforcement, 81 FED. RES. BANK OF RICHMOND ECON. Q. 
61, 68 (1995). 
 18. 409 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 19. Id. at 212.  
 20. Id. 
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racially integrated community is a redressable injury.21 
The Trafficante decision was followed two years later by an 
uncontroversial decision that civil plaintiffs asserting FHA claims are 
entitled to a jury trial.22 Then in the next two FHA cases to reach the 
Court, both again raising standing questions, the Court reiterated the 
broad view that civil actions could be brought not just by home buyers 
or renters turned away based on their race, but by residents of the 
community affected by race discrimination, and even by the 
community itself. 
In Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood,23 the plaintiffs were 
residents of the town who acted as testers in uncovering racial steering 
by the defendant realtors, and the village itself, which asserted that the 
realtors’ racial steering and blockbusting24 reduced property values, 
and hence property tax revenues.25 White testers were steered towards 
all-white neighborhoods, while black testers were steered towards an 
integrated neighborhood.26 Justice Powell, writing for the majority, 
found that these adverse consequences of racial steering were direct 
and profound, and amply qualified the plaintiffs, as residents of the 
affected community, to assert FHA claims.27 The opinion recognized 
not only the social harm to residents and the town caused by racial 
segregation as in Trafficante, but also the economic loss in property 
values and property tax revenues that flows from segregation.28 
Justice Rehnquist, in a dissent joined by Justice Stewart, put 
forward the more narrow view of who is harmed by housing 
discrimination. He argued that the civil remedy Congress authorized 
should be available only to the “direct” victims of discrimination, i.e., 
the parties to individual housing denials or racial steering, rather than 
to their neighbors.29 This narrow view of standing sounded a theme 
that echoes through a number of later dissenting opinions written by 
 
 21. Id. at 208–09. 
 22. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 191 (1974). 
 23. 441 U.S. 91 (1979). 
 24. “Blockbusting” refers to the practice of exploiting the fear of white homeowners that 
nonwhites are moving into their neighborhood in order to persuade them to sell quickly, while 
simultaneously promoting home sales to minority buyers in the same neighborhood, all in order to 
generate profits for realtors. See Amine Ouazad, Blockbusting: Brokers and the Dynamics of 
Segregation, 157 J. ECON. THEORY 811, 812 (2015). 
 25. Gladstone Realtors, 441 U.S. at 94–95, 109. 
 26. Id. at 95. 
 27. Id. at 110. 
 28. Id. at 110–11. 
 29. Id. at 126 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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the Court’s conservative justices. 
In its third major FHA standing case, Havens Realty Corp. v. 
Coleman,30 the Court recognized injury, and hence standing, for a 
tester, an African-American who did not actually intend to rent an 
apartment, but applied for housing and was given false information by 
a landlord.31 The white tester was told, accurately, that housing was 
available, while the African-American tester, who did not intend to 
rent an apartment, was falsely told no units were available.32 The court 
held, that the violation of the right to receive accurate information 
about housing availability was enough of an injury to warrant FHA 
standing.33 This informational injury was in addition to the type of 
neighborhood or community injury recognized in Gladstone Realtors 
and Trafficante. The court also held that a white tester who received 
accurate information was not injured, and therefore, would not have 
standing.34 Justice Brennan’s opinion, written for a unanimous court, 
was perhaps the high water mark for the Court’s broad interpretation 
of FHA standing. 
In the recent FHA cases coming before the Court, the theme 
changed from who is harmed by discrimination to who should be held 
responsible. Defendants raised various arguments to avoid liability, 
disclaiming any intent to discriminate, and denying that their conduct 
was the proximate cause of housing inequality. The issue of 
discriminatory intent arose repeatedly when federal agencies and 
private plaintiffs relied on proof of disparate impact as their theory of 
discrimination. Disparate impact theory, first approved by the Court 
in an employment discrimination case,35 holds a defendant responsible 
for any uniform policy or practice that disadvantages minority 
applicants and does not further a legitimate business purpose. 
Disparate impact discrimination does not depend on proof of the 
defendant’s discriminatory intent.36 In its enforcement of the FHA, 
HUD consistently applied disparate impact analysis to a wide variety 
of public and private housing practices.37 Eventually most of the 
 
 30. 455 U.S. 363 (1982). 
 31. Id. at 374. 
 32. Id. at 368. 
 33. Id. at 373–74. 
 34. Id. at 374–75. 
 35. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
 36. Id. at 432. 
 37. Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 
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federal Circuit Courts of Appeals ruled that disparate impact analysis 
was appropriate for FHA claims.38 In 2013, HUD adopted a regulation 
making explicit its prior interpretation that the FHA permits a finding 
of discrimination based on disparate impact analysis.39 
The first FHA disparate impact case considered by the Supreme 
Court involved a public zoning board’s ordinance that severely 
restricted the sites where multifamily housing could be built in the 
town, with the effect of virtually excluding minority residents from 
living there.40 The Court affirmed the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
decision invalidating the ordinance in a per curiam decision.41 The 
very brief opinion holds that the record as it stood was sufficient to 
make out a claim of disparate racial impact of the local zoning 
ordinance.42 The Court also noted that the defendant had conceded the 
applicability of disparate impact analysis.43 The legal issue whether 
the FHA authorized disparate impact analysis as a basis for liability 
was, therefore, left to another day.44 
That day finally arrived in 2015, in the case of Texas Dept. of 
Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, 
Inc.45 On two prior occasions, the Court had granted certiorari in cases 
raising the same issue, but in each case the parties settled before the 
Court could rule.46 The Texas DHCA case involved a challenge by a 
nonprofit advocacy group to a state agency’s site selection decisions 
in allocating low-income housing subsidies.47 The plaintiffs claimed 
that the DHCA’s policy of locating subsidized low-income housing in 
heavily minority neighborhoods contributed to furthering racial 
segregation.48 
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, grounded the Court’s 
definitive approval of disparate impact analysis in the sad legacy of 
 
2543 (2015). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 
11460 (Feb. 15, 2013) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100). 
 40. Town of Huntington v. Huntington Branch, NAACP, 488 U.S. 15, 16 (1988) (per curiam). 
 41. Id. at 18. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015). 
 46. Magner v. Gallagher, 565 U.S. 1013 (2011); Township of Mount Holly v. Mount Holly 
Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2824 (2013). 
 47. Texas DHCA, 135 S. Ct. at  2514. 
 48. Id. 
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various government policies including redlining, steering, and 
restrictive covenants, that insured the persistence of geographic 
segregation of races in the United States and perpetuated our vast 
opportunity and wealth gaps.49 In the opinion, he referred to the Kerner 
Commission’s conclusion that the uprisings of the 1960s arose in no 
small measure from the ghettoization and racial apartheid of American 
cities.50 
Justice Kennedy began by comparing the FHA to Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act, which has been long understood by the Court to 
permit disparate impact analysis.51 He then relied heavily on the fact 
that in the 1988 FHA Amendments, Congress seemed to approve, at 
least implicitly, a disparate impact approach.52 Several exceptions 
from FHA liability added by Congress—for example, permitting 
discrimination based on criminal drug convictions—would make no 
sense if Congress did not understand the FHA as covering disparate 
impact discrimination.53 Kennedy continued that disparate impact 
analysis is an important tool for achieving the central goal of the FHA, 
and is a useful means to uncover unconscious and covert racism.54 
In the remainder of his discussion, Justice Kennedy shifted gears, 
and went to considerable lengths to insist that courts give broad leeway 
to FHA defendants in evaluating their business justifications for 
suspect policies.55 He insisted that the a policy with a disparate impact 
need not meet a “necessity” test, but will be immune from FHA 
challenge if it is necessary to achieve a “valid interest.”56 Valid 
interests, he continued, may include many objective and subjective 
factors, including “market factors”, cost, historic preservation, and 
quality of life.57 In other words, the decisions of developers and 
housing agencies that exclude or limit housing for minorities may be 
insulated from discrimination challenges if one of these non-racial 
factors is successfully invoked as the “valid interest” being pursued by 
the challenged policy. So, for example, the defendant state agency in 
 
 49. Id. at 2515. 
 50. Id. at 2516. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 2519. 
 53. Id. at 2521. 
 54. Id. at 2521–22. 
 55. Id. at 2522. 
 56. Id. at 2523. 
 57. Id. at 2523. 
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the Texas DHCA case could assert that its valid interest in helping the 
poor justifies its policy of subsidizing new low-income housing in 
segregated minority neighborhoods. Justice Kennedy’s admonition 
requires courts to give these asserted policy interests substantial 
deference. 
In a similar vein, Justice Kennedy highlighted the importance of 
causation as an element in a disparate impact FHA claim, although 
causation was not an issue before the Court in the case. He noted that 
defendants should not be held liable for racial disparities they did not 
create; otherwise, governmental agencies and market actors might be 
forced to adopt racial quotas.58 The Texas DHCA might, for example, 
claim that its policy of building new subsidized housing in segregated 
neighborhoods was not the proximate cause of racial segregation, 
which instead was a product of private market decisions and other 
forces. 
Thus, the decision in Texas DHCA giveth and it taketh away. 
Disparate impact analysis, and the ability to assert FHA violations 
without proving racist intent, is available, yes. But plaintiffs must run 
the gauntlet of disproving the defendants’ litany of nonracial “valid 
interests” for discriminatory policies, and then show the causal 
connection between defendants’ policies and racial exclusion or 
segregation, in a context where the exclusion and segregation have 
been the legacy of decades. 
The American Bankers Association filed an amicus brief in the 
Texas DHCA case,59 as it did in the two prior cases challenging 
disparate impact analysis, although none of the Court’s FHA cases to 
date had involved discrimination in home mortgage lending. The keen 
interest of the banking industry arose from the fact that the Justice 
Department and private plaintiffs began bringing more and more 
discrimination claims against lenders using disparate impact analysis, 
especially under Attorney General Eric Holder starting in 2009.60 
Government and private plaintiffs had begun to bring FHA challenges 
to a number of mortgage lending practices, such as minimum loan 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. Brief for Am. Bankers Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Texas Dep’t 
of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015) (No. 13-
1371), 2014 WL 6660911 [hereinafter Brief for Petitioners]. 
 60. See Andrew Sandler & Kirk Jensen, Disparate Impact in Fair Lending: A Theory Without 
a Basis and the Law of Unintended Consequences, 33 BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL’Y REP. 18 
(2014); see also Brief for Petitioners, supra note 59. 
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amounts, broker pricing discretion, steering of borrowers to subprime, 
high-rate mortgages, and geographic redlining.61 
The banks argued that disparate impact analysis would stifle the 
market for mortgage loans, making banks overly cautious about 
lending policies that might produce statistically adverse effects on 
minority groups.62 Some of the banks’ fears were heightened when the 
Justice Department and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau sued a 
New Jersey bank and reached a $25 million settlement based on claims 
that the bank avoided operating branches in minority neighborhoods 
(although that case arguably included circumstantial evidence of 
discriminatory intent as well as discriminatory effects).63 The banks’ 
keen interest in the Fair Housing Act further intensified when cities 
began filing FHA lawsuits to challenge lending discrimination that led 
to the 2008 foreclosure crisis. 
III.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE: BANK OF AMERICA V. CITY OF MIAMI 
The Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) prohibits discrimination based on 
race, not only in selling and renting homes, but also in any residential 
real estate-related transaction, including mortgage lending.64 Bank of 
America v. City of Miami65 was the first FHA lending discrimination 
case to come before the Supreme Court. The case presented the Court 
with the opportunity to revisit, in the home financing context, both the 
“who is harmed” (standing) question and the “who is responsible” 
(causation) question. 
The City of Miami sued two of the nation’s four largest banks, 
Bank of America and Wells Fargo, for mortgage lending 
discrimination under the FHA.66 The City’s claim was that the banks 
concentrated needlessly risky subprime mortgage loans in minority 
neighborhoods, with the result that mortgage foreclosures, 
abandonment, and housing vacancies were concentrated in those 
 
 61. Alex Gano, Comment, Disparate Impact and Mortgage Lending: A Beginner’s Guide, 88 
U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1133–50 (2017). 
 62. Id. 
 63. CFPB and DOJ Order Hudson City Savings Bank to Pay $27 Million to Increase 
Mortgage Credit Access in Communities Illegally Redlined, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU 
(Sept. 24, 2015), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-and-doj-order-
hudson-city-savings-bank-to-pay-27-million-to-increase-mortgage-credit-access-in-communities-
illegally-redlined/.  
 64. 42 U.S.C. § 3605(a) (2012). 
 65. 137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017). 
 66. Id. at 1301. 
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neighborhoods.67 The City sought damages from the banks for the 
City’s increased expenditures for housing code enforcement, police 
and fire protection, and property tax losses resulting from foreclosures 
and home vacancies.68 
The District Court granted the banks’ motions to dismiss, holding 
that the City was not harmed in a manner that the Fair Housing Act 
was intended to address, and that any discriminatory lending by the 
banks was not the proximate cause of the City’s alleged losses.69 The 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding the City’s 
allegations of standing and proximate cause sufficient, relying inter 
alia on the Supreme Court’s prior decisions in Gladstone Realtors and 
Trafficante.70 
The banks urged the Supreme Court to reverse the Eleventh 
Circuit, advancing two arguments. First, the City should not have 
statutory standing as an “aggrieved person” under Section 3602(i) of 
the FHA because the harms the City alleged were not within the “zone 
of interests” Congress intended to protect.71 Second, the harms alleged 
by the City from concentrated mortgage foreclosures were not 
proximately caused by the banks’ conduct, because the chain of events 
connecting the alleged lending discrimination to the city’s losses 
occasioned by vacant homes was too complex and attenuated.72 
IV.  REASONING OF THE COURT 
Justice Breyer wrote the majority opinion, joined by liberals 
Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan, as well as conservative Chief Justice 
Roberts, while moderate Justice Kennedy and conservative Justice 
Alito sided with conservative Justice Thomas’ dissent. 
On both issues presented, the Court adopted compromise 
positions between those advocated by the City and by the banks. The 
majority’s analysis of the statutory standing issue is curiously 
ambivalent. Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer began by 
recalling that in its three prior cases, Gladstone Realtors, Trafficante, 
and Havens Realty, the Court had said that in the Fair Housing Act, 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 1307. 
 69. Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, No. 13-24506-CIV, 2014 WL 3362348, at *5–6 
(S.D. Fla. July 9, 2014). 
 70. Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 800 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 71. Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1301 (2017). 
 72. Id. 
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Congress conferred standing as broadly as Article III permits.73 Article 
III standing requires only an allegation of injury in fact to the plaintiff, 
a test the City had no trouble meeting. He added that Congress, aware 
of the Court’s expansive interpretation of FHA standing, amended the 
FHA in 1988 without altering the relevant statutory text.74 Had he 
simply stopped there, the holding would have been crystal clear. While 
other statutes75 may limit standing to plaintiffs within a narrow “zone 
of interests” protected by those statutes, the FHA had not previously 
been interpreted to include any such standing restrictions. 
However, Justice Breyer was not content to reaffirm the clear 
holdings of the Court’s prior FHA standing cases. He went on to write 
that even if the banks’ arguments were accepted, and if the FHA were 
read to limit standing to parties whose injuries meet some stricter 
“zone of interests” test, the City of Miami’s injuries would meet any 
such test.76 He described the prior cases as having held that plaintiffs 
similarly situated to the city of Miami met the statutory definition of 
“aggrieved person” under the FHA, i.e., the village in Gladstone 
Realtors that asserted lost tax revenues, the nonprofit organization in 
Havens Realty that alleged harm to its efforts to promote residential 
integration, and the white residents seeking to preserve their integrated 
community in Trafficante.77 This alternative rationale would seem to 
undermine the preceding analysis—that based on the Court’s cases, 
FHA statutory standing is as broad as the Constitution permits. It is 
not clear why Justice Breyer needed to apply a narrow standing rule 
that the Court was not adopting, unless perhaps to further rebut the 
arguments of the dissent. The majority opinion seems to leave the door 
at least somewhat open to a narrowing or revisiting of the broad FHA 
standing holdings of Gladstone Realtors, Trafficante, and Havens 
Realty in future cases. 
The majority’s discussion of causation likewise leaves the reader 
a bit perplexed. Justice Breyer began by rejecting the Eleventh 
Circuit’s approach, which was to equate proximate cause with 
 
 73. Id. at 1303–04. 
 74. Id. at 1304. 
 75. The banks, and the dissenting opinion, relied primarily on Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static 
Control Components, Inc., a 2014 case under the Lanham Trademark Act. 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1388 
(2014) (citing Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970)) 
(interpreting standing under the Administrative Procedures Act). 
 76. Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1304. 
 77. Id. at 1303. 
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foreseeability.78 Under that approach, banks would be liable for 
lending discrimination to any party whose resulting injuries were 
foreseeable. Permitting all parties foreseeably harmed by lending 
discrimination, Justice Breyer concluded, would lead down the 
slippery slope to “massive and complex damages litigation.”79 His 
solution was to invoke a directness requirement from cases under the 
Lanham Act80 and the RICO statute.81 In this brief two-paragraph 
discussion, the opinion ventures that “the general tendency. . . in 
regard to damages at least, is not to go beyond the first step.”82 On the 
other hand, what may be considered that “first step” in the causal chain 
will depend on the nature of the statutory claim and on what is 
administratively possible and convenient.83 Justice Breyer’s 
uncertainty regarding the City’s claim of causation makes no reference 
to the Court’s clear ruling in Gladstone Realtors, where Justice Powell 
seemed to have no doubts that the harms caused by housing 
discrimination to cities were direct and foreseeable: 
A significant reduction in property values directly injures a 
municipality by diminishing its tax base, thus threatening its 
ability to bear the costs of local government and to provide 
services. Other harms flowing from the realities of a racially 
segregated community are not unlikely.84 
Justice Breyer’s opinion concluded by leaving the precise rule 
elaboration for “direct” or proximate causation under the FHA, and its 
application, to the lower courts.85 As with the standing discussion, the 
majority opinion left plenty of room for both the City and the banks to 
advocate for their opposing interpretations as the litigation moves 
forward. The City will claim that vacancy and neighborhood blight are 
the direct result of discriminatory mortgage lending, while the banks 
will argue that the chain of events from making risky mortgages to 
neighborhood impacts is a chain going far beyond the “first step.” 
 
 78. Id. at 1305. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 1299. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. (citing Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 10 (2010)). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 110–11 (1979). 
 85. Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1306. 
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V.  THE DISSENT 
Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Kennedy and Alito, dissented, 
and would have adopted the banks’ positions on both the standing 
issue and the causation issue. Relying heavily on Lexmark, the Court’s 
2014 Lanham Trademark Act decision, and limiting the prior FHA 
cases to their facts, Justice Thomas would apply a narrow “zone of 
interests” test in interpreting the statutory standing Congress granted 
to “aggrieved persons.”86 He identified the quintessential aggrieved 
persons in FHA cases as prospective homebuyers or renters who face 
discrimination, but suggested that the outer limits of “aggrieved 
persons” would include those who live in an apartment complex or 
neighborhood that remains segregated as a result of discrimination.87 
He explained the decision in Gladstone Realtors permitting a village 
to sue as having implicated its statutorily protected interest in 
preventing racial steering and segregation of the village. He went on 
to assert that Miami was not claiming injury based on racial 
segregation of its neighborhoods, but only the harm of tax revenue 
losses, not an interest protected by the FHA.88 
As for the second issue, Justice Thomas characterized Miami’s 
claim as relying on a four-step causal chain, therefore too remote to 
satisfy the proximate cause requirement.89 Banks allegedly 
discriminated in the terms of mortgage loans, which led to 
foreclosures, which led to vacant homes, which led to decreased 
values for surrounding properties, and reduced city property tax 
revenues. Justice Thomas concludes, without discussing the Court’s 
prior FHA cases, that Miami’s chain of causation is too remote as a 
matter of law to amount to proximate cause.90 He adds that 
homeowners in neighborhoods devastated by foreclosures resulting 
from discriminatory lending “clearly” could not sue banks under the 
FHA.91 
 
 
 86. Id. at 1307 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 87. Id. at 1309. 
 88. Id. at 1310. 
 89. Id. at 1311. 
 90. Id. at 1311–12. 
 91. Id. at 1312. 
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VI.  ANALYSIS 
A.  The Court’s Ambivalence on Standing and Causation,  
and on the Systemic Nature of Racism 
Justice Breyer’s opinion, like Justice Kennedy’s in the Texas 
DHCA case, seems to tack between the broad and narrow views of 
responsibility and remedy for racial inequality in America, and seems 
to be searching for some middle ground. While reaffirming the broad 
standing holdings of prior cases,92 he insists on demonstrating the 
clear factual analogies between the standing of the City of Miami and 
the village of Bellwood in Gladstone Realtors,93 as if to say the Court 
is not adding to the categories of discrimination victims who may 
bring future claims under the FHA. While recognizing that 
discrimination may cause harms beyond those suffered by individual 
parties to home purchase and finance transactions, Justice Breyer and 
his colleagues seem reluctant to accept the consequences of that 
recognition and are determined to cabin the types of harms FHA 
plaintiffs may vindicate. 
The majority’s equivocation on standing will be particularly 
concerning to antidiscrimination advocates. The prior decisions in 
Gladstone Realtors, Trafficante, and Havens Realty were abundantly 
clear in extending FHA standing to any party meeting the 
Constitutional test of injury-in-fact. Justice Douglas expressed it this 
way in Trafficante: “[a prior Court of Appeals case found that the 
words ‘person claiming to be aggrieved’ showed] ‘a congressional 
intention to define standing as broadly as is permitted by Article III of 
the Constitution . . . . With respect to suits brought under the 1968 Act, 
we reach the same conclusion.”94 The brief concurrence by Justices 
White, Blackmun and Powell expressed skepticism that the plaintiffs 
could even meet the basic injury-in-fact test of Article III, but went on 
to say that the statutory language makes it clear that Congress intended 
to extend standing broadly to include the plaintiffs.95 
In Gladstone Realtors, Justice Powell, writing for the seven-
justice majority, again stated it plainly: “[s]tanding under § 812 [(civil 
actions)], like that under § 810 [(administrative complaints)], is ‘as 
 
 92. Id. at 1303. 
 93. Id. at 1304. 
 94. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972). 
 95. Id. at 212 (White, J., concurring). 
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broa[d] as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution.’”96 Yet again 
in Havens Realty, Justice Brennan, writing for a unanimous Court, 
wrote: “the sole requirement for standing to sue under § 812 is the Art. 
III minima of injury in fact: that the plaintiff allege that as a result of 
the defendant’s actions he has suffered ‘a distinct and palpable 
injury[.]’”97 Justice Powell wrote a separate concurrence only to 
express doubts about the Constitutional standing of the plaintiffs on 
the facts presented, without questioning in any respect the scope of 
FHA statutory standing.98 
The idea that other federal statutes confer standing more narrowly 
than Article III permits is not a new one. It cannot be said that the 
Court in 2017 needed to revisit the Fair Housing Act standing cases in 
light of new doctrinal developments in the law of standing. The banks’ 
“zone of interests” argument to narrow FHA standing in the City of 
Miami case traces its origins to language from a 1970 case, 
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp.99 
The Court in that case interpreted the Administrative Procedures Act 
(“APA”), and found that the APA limits standing to challenge agency 
actions to parties who are within the “zone of interests” protected by 
the substantive statute underlying the challenged agency action, in that 
case, the Bank Service Corporation Act.100 The Court applied this 
statutory standing doctrine, sometimes characterized as “prudential 
standing,” in numerous cases from 1970 through and including its 
2014 decision in Lexmark,101 involving statutory standing under the 
Lanham Trademark Act.102 On numerous occasions, the Court made 
it clear that 
the breadth of the zone of interests varies according to the 
provisions of law at issue, so that what comes within the zone 
of interests of a statute for purposes of obtaining judicial 
review of administrative action under the “generous review 
provisions” of the APA may not do so for other purposes.103 
 
 96. 441 U.S. 91, 109 (1979) (quoting Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209). 
 97. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372 (1982) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 
U.S. 490, 501 (1975)). 
 98. See id. at 366 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 99. 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386 (2014). 
 102. Id. at 1384. 
 103. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 163 (1997). 
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The Court was obviously aware of the “zone of interests” standing 
analysis on each of the three occasions, in 1972, 1979, and in 1982 
when the Court interpreted the FHA as having no such statutory 
limitation on standing. In fact, the Court of Appeals decision that the 
Supreme Court reversed in Trafficante, the first of the three cases, 
relied on the “zone of interests” standing test to deny standing to the 
plaintiffs.104 
Thus, Justice Breyer’s separate application of a “zone of interest” 
standing test to the city’s FHA claims would be necessary only if the 
Court were overruling its three prior FHA standing cases, something 
his majority opinion clearly did not do. At most, he is pointing out 
that, if the Court were inclined to reinterpret the FHA, City of Miami 
would not be a proper case in which to do so. When he concludes that 
“the City alleges economic injuries that arguably fall within the FHA’s 
zone of interests, as we have previously interpreted that statute,” he is 
necessarily saying that the zone of interests standing test under the 
FHA is no more restrictive than the basic Constitutional standing 
test.105 
Plaintiffs other than rejected minority housing applicants have 
played an important role in all the Supreme Court FHA cases and in 
many significant lower court cases. Developers seeking to build 
housing, nonprofit fair housing advocacy groups, and white neighbors 
have all been recognized as having important stakes in FHA 
enforcement and in having cognizable injuries flowing from 
discrimination. The point was eloquently made in an amicus brief filed 
in City of Miami by Anita Trafficante, the daughter of the plaintiffs in 
the Trafficante case.106 The most direct victims of discrimination are 
often unaware of the discrimination, are discouraged from vindicating 
their rights, or have genuine concerns about retaliation. Paul and 
Margaret Trafficante were white tenant activists who decided to 
challenge their landlord’s discriminatory conduct when they were 
faced with retaliatory eviction, and they later had to confront hate mail 
and threats for their role in the case.107 Housing discrimination that 
makes housing unavailable to minority groups, as in the case of 
 
 104. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 446 F.2d 1158, 1160–64 (9th Cir. 1971), rev’d, 409 
U.S. 205 (1972). 
 105. Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1305 (2017). 
 106. See Brief for Anita Trafficante et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Bank of 
Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017) (No. 15-1111), 2016 WL 5940648. 
 107. Id. at 15, 18. 
51.2_WHITE_V.9 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/5/19  5:20 PM 
430 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:413 
exclusionary zoning, has no specific individually identifiable direct 
victim other than the affected community. Private enforcement of the 
FHA would not be possible if cities and towns, developers, fair 
housing groups and neighbors could not bring suit. 
At various times, there have been dissenting Justices who would 
revisit the broad FHA standing holdings of Trafficante, Gladstone and 
Havens Realty, including of course Justices Thomas and Alito, two of 
the dissenters in City of Miami. The narrow views of both standing and 
causation are deeply rooted in a non-systemic, limited view of racism, 
as consisting of reprehensible acts of bigoted individuals against 
identifiable minority persons, violating an egalitarian consensus, and 
in Justice Thomas’ case, skepticism about the ability of the state and 
the courts to remedy discrimination.108 The narrow view blames the 
persistence of hypersegregation of African-Americans on the landlord 
who will not accept a nonwhite tenant, the real estate agent who steers 
a black customer to black neighborhoods, or on the benign choices of 
black and white families moving to better schools, jobs and 
environments. 
The broader view of FHA liability challenges the 
individualization of both the victim and the perpetrator. Certainly, the 
bank defendants would be responsible, even under a narrow view, for 
economic costs they imposed on minority homeowners who lost their 
homes as a result of needlessly unfair and risky subprime mortgage 
terms. The broader view makes the connection between those 
individual mortgage loan decisions and the neighborhood impacts of 
concentrated foreclosures, loan denials, and the resulting decline in 
home values and economic activity. If the bank can point the finger of 
blame at the white homeowner who flees an integrating neighborhood, 
and the homeowner points the finger at the bank or the local zoning 
board, no one is responsible for segregation. 
American racism as a system excluded blacks from all but a few 
neighborhoods and confined them to ghettos. The extreme racial 
segregation in US cities has persisted for 150 years since 
Reconstruction, and for fifty years since the second wave of civil 
rights legislation, including the Fair Housing Act. But who is 
responsible, and who, therefore, can be sued? The reality of racial 
 
 108. Scott Lemieux, Why Clarence Thomas’ Rulings on Race are so Idiosyncratic, NEW 
REPUBLIC (May 23, 2017), https://newrepublic.com/article/142825/clarence-thomass-rulings-race-
idiosyncratic. 
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segregation is the product of thousands of actions and decisions, 
including those by the white residents of Saint Louis who banded 
together to record restrictive covenants in the 1920s, after the 
explicitly racial zoning ordinances enacted by city councils were 
struck down in Buchanan v. Warley, the New Dealers at the Federal 
Housing Administration who drew up the redlining maps to direct 
federal funds for home loans to white-only areas, and the public-
private partnership between the Federal Housing Administration and 
mortgage lenders who systematically excluded blacks from low-cost 
home financing for the four decades following the Great Depression 
and World War II. In such a system, the only way civil liability for the 
harms caused by discrimination can function is with a causation theory 
that recognizes multiple and simultaneous contributing causes, rather 
than permitting every fair housing defendant to point the finger at 
discrimination by others. 
B.  How Plaintiffs Will Demonstrate Causation After City of Miami 
The holding of City of Miami on the standing issue is clear: 
standing to bring Fair Housing Act claims still extends to any plaintiff 
who demonstrates injury-in-fact, i.e., who meets the basic Article III 
standing requirements.109 At the very least, cities economically 
harmed by realtor blockbusting or bank redlining have standing to sue. 
The challenge for plaintiffs after City of Miami will be to confront the 
Court’s far murkier holding regarding proximate cause. The decision 
clearly tells us that foreseeability of harm is necessary, but not 
sufficient, to show proximate cause. Plaintiffs and courts will thus 
have to grapple with the additional element of “directness” in 
connecting defendants’ conduct to plaintiffs’ injuries. 
Redlining and reverse redlining by banks cause several direct 
harms to affected residents and communities. Redlining refers to 
policies like those alleged in the Hudson City Bank case of refusing to 
offer home loans in defined neighborhoods or communities.110 While 
the Justice Department can pursue claims referred by various bank 
regulators, its capacity to police the entire banking industry is 
 
 109. Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1303–04. 
 110. CFPB and DOJ Order Hudson City Savings Bank to Pay $27 Million to Increase 
Mortgage Credit Access in Communities Illegally Redlined, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU 
(Sept. 24, 2015), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-and-doj-order-
hudson-city-savings-bank-to-pay-27-million-to-increase-mortgage-credit-access-in-communities-
illegally-redlined. 
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obviously limited. The causation issue for private plaintiffs 
challenging bank redlining is to identify and prove the economic and 
social injuries suffered in communities that are not being served. 
Lender decisions to restrict access to mortgage credit in certain 
neighborhoods have measurable and lasting consequences, including 
lower home prices (and hence lower municipal tax revenues).111 The 
most direct victims of redlining are the least likely to know about it, 
or be in a position to assert FHA claims. The ability of cities and 
nonprofit advocacy group testers to bring redlining claims is vital to 
uncovering and preventing racial redlining. 
Reverse redlining refers to the targeting of minority communities 
for unfairly and unnecessarily disadvantageous home loans, including 
those with high interest rates and fees, prepayment penalties, and other 
terms not imposed on other homeowners.112 It may be easier to 
identify reverse redlining victims, that is, individuals who obtained 
unfairly priced mortgages, whose injuries can be readily 
demonstrated. On the other hand, excessively risky mortgages leading 
to needless foreclosures injure two distinct groups: the homeowners 
who lose their homes, and their neighbors whose property and 
community values are undermined.113 An extremely narrow view of 
causation would hold that reverse redlining’s most direct victims are 
the minority homeowners who are given needlessly expensive and 
risky loans, and their direct injuries are measured by the difference 
between the cost of their loan and the cost of a loan on fair terms 
offered in comparable non-minority areas. This narrow view of injury 
would absolve lenders engaged in reverse redlining from 
responsibility for the overwhelming majority of economic harms 
caused by their practices, the devastation that concentrated 
foreclosures can inflict.114 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Banks, realtors, and landlords have failed to persuade Congress 
to weaken private enforcement of the Fair Housing Act; they can be 
 
 111. Ian Appel & Jordan Nickerson, Pockets of Poverty: The Long-Term Effects of Redlining 
(Oct. 15, 2016), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2852856.  
 112. United Cos. Lending Corp. v. Sargeant, 20 F. Supp. 2d 192, 203 n.5 (D. Mass. 1998). 
 113. See Jacob Rugh, Double Jeopardy: Why Latinos Were Hit Hardest by the US Foreclosure 
Properties, 66 J. URB. ECON. 164 (2009). 
 114. See G. THOMAS KINGSLEY ET AL., THE URB. INST., THE IMPACTS OF FORECLOSURES ON 
FAMILIES AND COMMUNITIES (2009).  
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expected to continue pressing the courts to do so. The courts should 
decline the invitation to follow the path advocated in Justice Thomas’ 
dissent, a path perhaps left open in Justice Breyer’s ambivalent 
majority opinion, the path of reinterpreting the Fair Housing Act to 
restrict standing or impose novel causation requirements. The Fair 
Housing Act is a Congressional statute, and the Supreme Court is 
appropriately reluctant to overrule its own statutory interpretations, 
because Congress remains free to amend a statute if the Court has 
erred in its interpretation.115 This rationale has particular force in the 
case of the Fair Housing Act. Congress amended the statue in 1988, 
after the Court’s three standing decisions, not to cut back on private 
civil enforcement actions, but on the contrary, to strengthen them, for 
example by increasing the ceiling for punitive damages. As discussed 
above, Congressional action was entirely consistent with the Court’s 
broad standing decisions, and with the use of disparate impact analysis 
later approved by the Court in the Texas DHCA case.116 In the nearly 
fifty years since passing the Fair Housing Act, Congresses controlled 
by Democrats and by Republicans have never once acted to restrict 
civil enforcement of the FHA in the ways suggested by the banks in 
City of Miami. 
The second and deeper reason to preserve the broadest possible 
understanding of who may seek redress for housing discrimination, 
and whose conduct may be held responsible for it, is the fact that 
housing discrimination and racial segregation are at the root of so 
many other forms of racial inequality in our society. It makes little 
sense to allow only first-order victims of discrimination to sue, nor to 
allow only the first-level harms caused by discrimination to be 
redressed, when housing discrimination has so many participants and 
so many victims. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 115. Patterson v. McLean Fed. Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172–73 (1989). 
 116. Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 
(2015). 
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